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Resentment and moral judgment in
Smith and Butler
Alice MacLachlan
How many things are rcquhiG to render the Brarification ol rcsentmenr
cohpletely ag.!.able ... ?
(rMS Lii.3.8)
Introductiott
Adam Smith expresses a fair amount of ambivalenc€ towards the passion
of rcs€ntrnent. In the opening pages of fie Thegry of Mora! Senim;nl, he
citcs it as a passion whose expression initially ,eicires do sort of sympathy,
but ... selvelsl rarher to dhgusr and provoke us'(Smirh 1976, flts t,i,f.f).
Ercn more than in other cases, ve must .b.ing home, th€ particularities of
the resendul p€rson's circumstances and plovocation !o ou;sehes anil, in
particular, we must figure out whether we sympathie with his antagonist's
motives 
- 
before we can possibly 'enter into' his emotional statc. Our sympathy
with res€ntment is always indirect and secondary lndeed, resentment bclongs
to the class of'unsocial' passions, alongside haked and spitei those emot-
ions whose immediate effects arc most disagreeable to th€ specrator (1.ii.3.5).
Thcre is thus almost no foreshadowing. in the opening pag€r of TVS, of
tlre tolc resentment will com€ to play in part lI: Of Merit and Dem€rit.
R€sentment reappcars therc as a fully-fledged moral sentiment, whose natural
attributes are such that they successfully ground our moral judgments of
demerit or blame, just as our natural s€ntiments of gratitude ground ourjudgments of merit or praise, Res€ntnent 
- 
it would appea. 
- 
has tecome
This e$say is a discussion of the 'moralization' of r€sentment. By
moralizatior, t do not refer to the complex process by which resentment ii
transformed by the machinations of sympathy, but a prior chang€ in how the
'raw material' of the emotion itself is presented. ln just over fifiy pages, not
only Smith's attitude towards the passion of resentrnent, but also his very
conception of the term, appea$ to shift dramatically. What is an unpleasant,
nsocial and relatively amoral passion of anger in general metamorphos€s
into a morally and psychologically rich account of a cognjtively sharpened,
Ti€ Philosophy ol Adan Snirh, The Adam Smirb R.viw. 5: l6l-t ?? @ 2010 The I.tematonal
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Dormatively Ladcn attitude, an attitude that contains both the judgment that
the injury donc to me was unjusr and wrongful. and rhe de;and thar
the offender acknowledge its wrongfulness.l Two very diffcrent readings of
'Smithian resentment' are thus available from the text. lndeed. rhe noti;n of
two drstrncl lorm. ol reseotment an in.lincti\e. amoral version and a fich,
rationally appraising attitude 
- 
would bring Smith into line with an earlier
account of r€sentment, found in Bishop Joseph Butler\ Fifieen Sennons
Preached at Rolb Chapel. fir:t published in I?26. Ulrinareli I argue. rhe
diflerences in their theories are !o Sm;th,s credit. It is precisely bcciuse the
'thin' or generic rctaliatory passion descdbed in pan I can be reconciled with
th€ rich, normative attitude in Pa( lI, that Smith is able to accomplish
his meta-ethical goal of grounding moral judgments in naturatty occuiring
Resentme[t in The Theor] of MoruI Sentirrrents paft |
When res€ntrncnt makes its first appearance in TMS, it does so as a
completcly disageeable emorion, b€longing to a class of .unsocial passions'
whose occurcnces ale unlikely to elicil sympathy from a spectato; Smith
offers a couplc of reasons for our lack of sympathy with rcsenrment. In rhe
firs! place, situations of resentmcnt ahvays prcsent two individual intercsts in
conffict: 'our sympathy is divided berwe€n rhc person who feels [it], and rheperson who is the objecr of [ir]' (t.ii_3.1). As spectators, we rherefore nccessa_
dly lose a little of our potential passion to an opposin8 sympathy, at leasr
until we are convinced that thc resentment is appropriate given iti occasion(provocation) and its intensity is moderate. We can accomplish this only by
attempting and failing to sympathize with the motives ;f tle object of
resentm€nt (the odginal offender). Sympathy with rcsentment always requires
some reflection. But not even justified rcsentment can wholly capturc our
sympathy; its 'immediat€ effects are so disagr€cable, that even when [it is]
most justly provokcd, there is still something about [it] rvhich disgusts us;(r.ii.3.5).
Smith conclr.rdes in Palt I that cven warranted. moderate resenrment
presenls som€thing ofa chall€nge to our capacities fo. imaginative sympathy,
aod its naturally unsympathetic nature should give us great pause b€fore wc
endoNe any €xpression offt:'iherc is no passion, of whi€h the human mind is
capable, conccming whose justness we ought to be so doubtful, conceming
whose indulgence we ought so car€fully to consult our natural sens€ of pro-
priety, or so diligem\r to consulr what wjll be the senrimenls of the ;ool
and impartial spcctaror'. ln fact, thc passion of resentment is best rim,rldred:
wc should resent more from a 'sense of the propdety of resentmcnt. from a
sense that mankind expect and rcquir€ it oi ui' ttran because wc acarally
eirperlercs the emotion (1.ii.3.8). Appropriate resentrnent h ali€nated reseni-
ment; rather lhan a natulally occurring emotion, it is in fact the barest simu_
lacrum of one. Only once resentment has been lowcred in pitch, tested in
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rcfledion and exprcsscd morc from guarded duty rhan anyrhing ehc, cdn \\e
rendcr ll agrccable to a slrrnpathettc specktor
Res€nbnent in The Theory of Mordl Sentiments p^rt Il
Given.the vivid pjcture Smith paints ol resentment's disagreeable and funda_
mentally antisocial naiure in part I, it is surprising thar in parr II of TMa.
resenlment lakes on a much morc signific?nt role in our moral psychotogy.
and thar our symparhy wilh rcrcntmenr now becomes absolurely cruciallo
our ability ro form judgments of moral demerit. In ran tt Smiit aaoprs agenerall) more balanced vrew of resenrment, pre.enring ir as porenrialll soci_
able rn narure. and capable of appearing symparhetrc ro ontookers. Unjer tne
nghr condrtrons. we may 'heardly and enrircly sympaL\i7e wirh rhe resenl_
mentof the sufferci (II.i.4_4) so rhat our.owr anirnosity entirely correspoias,
witl her own (11.i.5.8). Smith now acknowledge" tt ut u aenciency oi'.e"eni_
ment may b€ censured as wcll as ils excess: .we sometimes comilaln that ap.iniftlar.per\on shows too li le sprrir. and has loo lirrle sense oirhc injunes
lhat have been done to him: and we are as rcady ro despise him for rhe dcfect,
rs to hare him for rhc crcess ol thi, pajsion {1t...5.g).
smllh rs not unaware of the apparent rncongruence ot lhese rwo picturcs ol
resenthent, or thc common hesitation to grant resentment the siatus of a
moral sentiment. Hc rcmarks:
To ascribe in this manner our natuml sense of the ill dcserl of human
altions to a sympathy with the resentment of the sutrerer, may seem, tothe greater pa of peoplq to be a degradarion of tiut ieott neni
Rcsentrnenl is.commonly rcgarded as so odious a pa(sron, rhat they wrl:
be apt to lhrnk it impossible that so laudable a principle. as the se;se of
the ill deserr of vice, should in any respect be founo.o,iir"l 
il., , , 
"",",
Wary ol his audrence\ natural suspicion ot rcsenrmenr. Smift takes gr-ear carc
ro dcvelop his accounl of rcsenrmenr a. a moral senLirnenr. ci'pable olgrcunding judgments of demerit, in a se;cs of small steps, and aiways inparallel wilh claim rhar judgments of mcrir are grounded in natural feetingi otgmtitud€, 'because gratitude ... is regarded as an amiable principle, which-can
take nothing lrom the wonh of whatcver js foundcd uion iti (ILi.5.7). He
accomplishes this task in several slagcs.
Smith's first step is !o note that d€merit is rhc quality of derer!,r?g punish_
ment. Bnt delermining that some$ing dese.r'es punishrncnt is to sa/no morr
or less tlan that we do (or would) approv€ ofits punishmenl, or rather: that it
is an approved or proper objcct of whatever it is that *ot;vates us to punish.
At this point in the texr, Smith defines punishrnent as a tind of .."co*ieisJ,
'lo rctum evij for evrl thar has b€m done.{U.i.L4). punrsbmcnt is nor'nec;s_
sanly a moral reaflion lo wrongdoing {and it includec rcvenge), bur approved
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or deserved punishment is So the second step is to move frorn the object of
d€served punisbmmt to the object of a motive to punish which we can
approve 
- 
or, drawing on the materials of part I 
- 
with which we ca!
sympathize.
Her€ Smith re-introduces resentment. Resentmcnt, he argues, is the only
passion that directly motivates us to be the instument of another's misery
{i.e. lo render evil ) 0l.i.l.5). Hau€d and dislik€ might lead us to w,s} misery on
someone else, but unless we are exceptionally vicious, we do not also want
to be th€ cause of that misfortune: tle 'very tlought of voluntarily con-
lributing' to such misery will shock us beyond all measure Resentsnent is the
only passion to contairL necessarily, the desire tlat the object of out resent-
menl suFer 'by our mean$ and upon account of that particular injury which
he had done to us' 0li.l.7). The passion of res€ntment is what motivates us
to punish otherE and so the third step of Smith's argument is to concludc
lhat the object of dese cd punishment, that is, the object of an approved
motive to punish, is also the proper object and thus the appropriate larget of
our naturally occutring resentment, For this to carry explanatory weight,
Smith must presumably draw on lhe picture of this naturally occurring passion
already familiar to the reader from Part L ln the final stcp of his argumeni,
Smith notes that the proper object of resentment is the object, or target, of
proper lesentment: that is, of resentrnelt with which 'the heart of every
impartial spectator sympathizes ... and evcry indifferent by-stander entirely
ent€rs into, and goes along with' (ll.i.2.2).
Thus for Smith, our judgments of demerit are ultimately grounded in our
naturally occurring sympalhies with rcsenirnent both our o*n and oth€r
people's. This is not a counier-intuitive account of retributivc judgments,
bu i! is perhaps a litlle surDrising, givcn Smith's conclusion in TMS
Part I: namely, tha! resentment is all but utterly unqmpathetic and what€ver
symPathy we do achieve is an indirect consequmc€ o/no, sympathizing., tn
fact, he remarkE our judgments of demerit are compound sentimentsr com-
posed both of our dir€ct antipathy to the lnon' 6 of the perf,etmtot and our
resulting indirect sympathy with the r€sentment of the sufferer. One might
think that Smith could skip ovcr the problem of sympathizing with resent-
ment altogether, and develop an account of demerit from the impropriety of
the perpetrator\ motives, deduced by our failure to sympo,thize with those
motive& and an objective assessment of the resultant harm to the victim.
Inde€d, wEre Smith !o account for judgments of deme;t in the manner jusr
skctched, he would have emerged as far morc of a pmro-utilitarian than he
does. But Smith expressly avoids groundin8 our sense ofdemedt and injustice
in g€neral assessments of social harm or utility in llii.3.,f-s, focusing instead
on'that consciousness ofill-deserf which'nature has implanted in the human
breast': namely. rcscnrment (ll.ir.3 4,
Smith takes res€noncnt to be crucially important to molaljudgment and
indeed, to political and legal institutions ofpunishment. At first, resentment\
importance appea$ to be a matter of utility: 'the natural gratification of this
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passion.rends, of its oir.n accord, to produce all rhe political ends of punir
T:r.ttl Lhe _ congcrlon of rhe criminal, and the exanple to the populatir0li.l.6), but Smith paints a much morc vivid piciure ot the'innedit
propri€ty of punitive resenhenl prior ro any consid€rations of uril;ty, wh
describing a murder viclim:
His blood, we think, calls aloud for vengeatce, The very ash€s of t
d€ad seem.ro be disturbed ar the rhoughr that his injur;s are to p:
unrevenged. ... Naturg antecedent to all rcfi€ctions ulon the utility
punishment, has in rhis manner stampcd upon the human heart. in t
strongest and mosl indelible characrcrs. an rmmedrarc and insiinclr
approbation of the sacrcd and neccssary law of rctaliation.
01.i.2.
In tying judgments ofdemeril so closely to our desire to punish, cxpressed
the naturally occuning passion of resentment, Smith argues thar m;ral iud
menrs ol demerit conrarn a morivational elemenr. necessarily shared by ihr
who make the judgment- Judgmenls of btame have action-guiding properri,
and these explain how I,e come to have a sense ofiustice. ;€cessa; fo; socj
mechanisms of retriburive justice.
Furthermorq resentments of any kind, wheth€r proper or imprcp
contain a desire for dccrtmtability and acknowtedgemenr frorn rbe wrongdot
that she be made to grieve on account of hcr behavior.rr towards m-e_ t
resmrer: nol only that he shoutd bc pudshcd. bur rhar he should be punish,
by our means, and upon account of that particular injury which he had dor
to us'(ILi.l.6). Sympathy with tlat resentment is, at the same rime, appro!
of that demand for acknowledgement. Our judgmenS ofdemcrit, as implir
g€stures- 9f such sympathy, ar€ thus also judgments of respect towar
the victim of wrongdoing, as they acknowledge her claims in wals that i
alErnarive, utilrtarian roure ro demerir would noL.
Two Resentments in The Theory of MoMl Sentimentsl
The account of moral judgments presented in paft II of the TMS describ€s
as experiencing, when we rcscnt, a normatively lad€n, moralized retributi
emotion. Smitht description will be familiar ro those ,aquainted wi
contempomry philosophical discussions of resentmenr, for example pet
Strawson's description of resentnent as a panicipant reactive attitude (200:
Jeffrie Vurphy 12003) and Jeffrie Murphy and Jean Harnpron! (1988) defen,
of resentment as a virtuq and rccent treatmcnts by Cha es Criswold (200
and Thomas Brudholm (2008) among others. Not everytling we ordinari
describe as resentrnent, for exampl€, can meet this account a;orc lechnica
rarefied defnition is required.3 Does Smith provide such an appropriate
technical dcfinilion in his inirial description of rhe passion? The answer
both yes and no. tn facr, it\ possible to read ttre iVS as presenting tr
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entirely separate accounts of resentmcnr, only one of which me€ts the standard
demanded by contemporary philosophical heatments of resentinent. This is,
for examplq the reading offered by Stephen Daruall.a On rhis reading. we
can understand Smith to use 'resentment, loosely at first, as nothing more
than a rough synonym for ange. Later in par! lI, when it becomes necessary
to_€xplain how certain kinds of angry reactions are capable of grounding
fully-fiedged moral judgments, he focuses on a richer. more sympathetic.
cognitively sharpened, attitude. The s€cond alternative is to argue that Smith
uses resenttnent consist€ntly to describe a single psychological state, bul that
his discussion in Part II draws out aspects or implications of that staie left
dormant in Part L This inlerpretation requires that we square the rich, nor-
matively laden properties of what I have called Smith,s moraliz€d resenhenr
and what Darwall calls 'second-personal resentmeni' with the thinner, un_
momlized account of natumlly occurring resentment Smith provides in part ll.
Whilc ev€ntualiy I intend to defend the second alternative, ;nd to argue that a
full understanding of the moraliz€d resentment of part Il recognizes it as the
culrnination of Smilh's earliet non-moral rcsentment and not as a separate if
rclatcd psychological state, it is important to establish just how much Smith's
pr€sentation of resentmenr changcs"
ln the opcning sections of the TMS, Smith uses .rcsentment, interchargeably
with'anger','fury','ourage'and'indignation'(I.i.t.?, Li.4.6, t.i.5.a). Hc
do€s not consistently rcserve one term for moderate instances ofthe others. or
thosc in"lance, $hich dn independent lhird pa y could rccognize as having
becn Jusrified by (appropriare to) the acr that provoked rhem_ Smith notes
these arc passions we sharc with children and with .brutes' (Lii. 1.3), and rhat
they are passions apt to seiz€ hold of and dislort our reason, rather lhan
remaining s€nsitive to it. Sometimes!'rcsentment' contains the expressed
desire for reverge or retaliation (though the desired ac! does not appear to be
a fully-fiedged retibutive responsc, as warranted punishment might be), and
at other times it is litde morc than an instinctive angry reaction. Neither is
one anger-tetm the genus of which others are thc species. Much later in the
TMS, when criticizing Hutcheson's moral sysrem, Smith alludes in passing to
'emotions ol particular t r/s' whose gcneral features arc consistent even while
subject to variation, and he mentions anger/resentment as one such generic
kind (Vu.iii.3.l3). The term ttrus scems to rcfer ro a family of retaliarive
states.
Clearly, Smith's descriplion ofresenrmcnt in Part It is much more elabomre.
while he continu€s occasionally to swap the terms'resentment,,.anger,and
'indignation'(11.ii.2.3, lliii.l.l). rcsentm€nr is now rhat sentiment which not
only dir€ctly prompls us to punish, but also wishes evil (punishment) to
the wrongdoer by our means, on account of our injury and in such a way that
he be made to suffer grief, repcntance and regrer for thar injury (and nor
simply .cgret at having experienced the puishmenr). ln otler words" the
passion of resentmenr row contains the wkh that the perpetrator come to feel
towads thc original injury in jusr the same way rhai \ve do, that hc now share
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our attitude. The suffici€ni conditions for resenting someone have riscn
drarnatically.
We cannot makc sensc of this textual shift by insisting that rcsentmcnt in
Part II is simply whar Smirh rnlended by propci resenl,nenr in pan I; whar
I havccalled moralized resenrmenr is no( a modcrare, appropriarely occurrinp
v€rsion of'thin' or gencric resentment. In the initial passages on iesenrmentl
Smilh speaks ofproper or sympatbetic rescntment, lrlrt as a moraliz€al versio,
of the general passroD, containing an explicidy rnoraj claim about wmngfuj
rnjury but rather as a verbally and behaviourally moderare instance of il
Proper rcsent-rnent is fury held in check (Lii_3_8). There is Iinle or no allusion
to the kind of desire for accountability descibcd in part lI, where to resenl
someone ist at the same time, ro wish to ,bring him back to a morc just sense
of what is due to other peoplq to make him scnsible of what he owes us, and
of the wrong h€ has donc us' (Il.iii.l.6). ln parr lt, rhe cri!€ria for what qua.
lifies as resentmcnt have not only riscn but have also .hanged in na].flt;t ft
reseot is (o wish specific things rcgarding rhe wrongdoer's adtudes and no1
simply his (mis)fortunes. Prcper resentmenr, in part l, is that resentrnenl
which is justiied and modemte. Rcsmtment in Part lI can be both iustified
and unjustified: we can be wrong about what transpired or who rs resionsibte
for our wrongdoing we can wish a chang€ of atlitudc on tlrc wrontperson,
or under the wrong circumsrances. Darwallt claim 
- 
that Smith appears to bc
discussing a new psychological state alrogether 
- 
is far from implausible.
Furthermore, in Parr II, resentment has becn recast as a sociable attitude. in
at least two senscs: first, we can resenr sympathetically with orhcrq o. on their
behalf, as well as our own. Second, in resenting, we d€mand something from
the p€rpetrator 
- 
a change in her attitudes ResenL.nent thus represc;b an
ongoing emotional engagement with he.: again, a morc sociable attitude than
is presente{ in Part I.
R€sentrnent in Butler's Fifreen Sermons
Were Smith to identify rescntment as a broad emotional category containjnC
both moralized and non-momlizcd versions, he would nor be the fnt. That is
exactly the account of resentmcnt off€red in Bishop Joseph Butler.s F,ree,
Semons Prcached at the Rolk Chapel (1949 [1126]). There is not an exrensive
literature exploring Butler's influence on Smith's understanding of resent-
ment although Griswold notes that's€ve!a1 ofthc points Smith makes aboul
anger or resentmcnr' including a crucial distinction b€tween moral and non_
moral resentment, are anricipared in Burl€r's Se'noru (Griswold 1999: I l7).5
D.D. Raphael and A.L Macfie limit Butlerl influence on Smith !o the
'unconscious repetition of phrases' in rhef introduction to TMS (19?6: I l),
Nhile a rcccnt paper by James Hanis sugg€sts that Smith's afrnity and debt
to Butler has been generally undcr-appreciated (Hanis 2008: l5).
Rcsentmeni presents a slightly different puzzle for Butld rhan it does
for Smith. He opens his sermon on resentment by asking: ,Why had man
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implanted in hirn a principle, vr'hich appears the direct contrary to bene-
volence?' (Butler 1949: 121). On the on€ hand, rcsentment can't be writlen
off, since'no passion God hath endued us with can be in itselfevil' (122), but
at the same time r€s€ntment does not appcar to be good, either ils object
(the misery of another peEon) appears directly contrary to the duty of b€ne-
volencg and to the Christian pr€cept 'love thine enemies'. He is even
prepared to allow that rcsentment 'is in every instance absolutely an evil in
itself, becaus€ i! implies producing misery' (139). Yet, resentment is a natuml
passion, and 'natural' for Butler carries normative forc€, as it implies God-
given.6 Ultimately, Butler argues for the compatibility of moderate res€ntment
with both benevol€nce and his admittedly minimalisr reading of Christian
forgiven€ss, but it remains in his text a 'painful remedy' to the fact of injury
and violence, and is subject to excess and abuse.? we n€ed the passion of
resentrn€nt to correct for what would otherwise be motivational defcienciesl
namely, our ability to punish and deter wrongdoing - but it would be better if
offenders were brought to jusrice through the cool consid€rations of reason
and reflectior alone (131).
'What, according to Butler, do w€ mean by resentment? According to his
se(mon on the topic, 'resentment' represents both a genus and a sp€cies of
emotion - and again, his dislinclions are complicated by the fact that he
occasionally exchanges the word 'anger' for 'resen!men!'. Hc divides gen€ric
rescnment (generic anger) into two kinds: (l)'hasty and suddcn' anget also
known as passion, and (2) 'settled, deliberate' resentment. Hasty anger is
morally indifferent, instinctive and often irmtional; Butlcr compares it to
blinking something out of one's eye. It is experienced by infanis and animals
as well as adults and from lhis Butler concludes it cannot be the etrect of
reason, but is excited by 'merE sensation and feeling' (lz) g
Butler spends a great deal morc time tackling the problematic phenomenon
of settled. deliberate resentmcnt. Becaus€ even miional, reffective peopl€ can
experi€nce rescntment, it must be the effect of reason, he argues, but th€ only
way rcason could raise any anger is to represent not just harm, but injustice
or injury ofsomc kind. The object of r€seniment is thus not su{Tering or harm
p?/ re, but moral evil (126). The very cmotion of (settled, deliberate) resent-
ment always contains the belief that the object of my resentment has behaved
unjustly, and has caused an injury of some kind. This is €vid€nt' Buder
sugges6 from thc considerations likely to rais€ oa lower our resentment:
whether the act was performed by d€sign or was inadvertent' whether the
offendcr yielded to strong temptation or acted v,/ithout provocation' whether a
prior friendship offers evidence of the offendert other rcdeeming qualities,
and so on - that is, moral consideralions conc€ming the wrongdoer's motives
and hcr chalactcr (126). Butlcr concludes that settled r€sentm€nt is'plainly
connected with a scnse of virtue and vice, of moral good and evil' (125): that
is, it is always already moralized. In fact, he uses the moralized nature of
resentment as evidence against psychological egoism: 'why should men dis-
pule conceming the realily of virtue, and whether it be fourd€d in the nature
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of things ... when cvcry man carries about him this passion, which affolds
him demonstration, that the rulcs ofjustice and equity arc to be lhe guide of
his actions?' (l3l).
Setded resentment is cartainly not morally infallible; Butler provides a long
and rather wonderful discussion of its various excesses and abuses, including
malic€ and r€venge In fact, while raised by Eason and nominally sensitive to
reason's claim\ resenbnent also has 'a certain detetmination and r€solute
b€nt of mind not to be convinced or s€t right'(129). We should thus be wary
of resentment's ability to latch on and take hold. Budeis cautions regarding
rescntment rcsonate with Smith! admonition that we resent more fiotn a
distanccd sense of its pmpriety than because we have actually succumbcal 1ojts charms (fMS 1.ii.3.8). Luckily, though, the abuses of resentmcnt are
primarjly limited to our owD, pe$onal grudges: thos€ resentments arising
from injuries to ourselves, or those whom w€ consid€r as ourselves (Butlcr
1949: 126). Impartial rcsentment or indignation in other words, a spectator's
resentmcnt is tllus an appropriate standard for measuring partial res€ntmcntl
the victim ought 'to b€ afrected towards the injurious person in the samc way
any good men, uninterested in the casc would be, if they had ihe same just
sensq which we supposed the injured person to havc, of the fault' (Butlcr
1949: 143) that is, if they are impa(ial and we -informed.
Smith rs. Butler on moralizing r€scntment
Butler oudin€s two distinct forms of resentnert or anger; a thin, instinctive
reaction to harm of any kind and a rich, moralized attitude that taryets only
our perc€ptions ofinjustice and injury The latter is expr€ssly identified as the
origin ol our motive to punish, and is 'plainly conn€cted' with our 'sense of
virtue and vjcg'. Furthermore, we evaluate th€ latter emotion with refercnce
to the standard of an impartial bystand€r.e Can we make s€nse of the appar-
ent inconsistency in Smithian rcsentment by reading Butler's two kinds of
resentment into the text ofTMS? lf so, the discussion ofresentmenl in Par! I
could be und€rstood as a discussion of sudden, hasty anget ot more plau-
sibly, of anger/resentment in general, containing for th€ time being 
- 
both
hasty, sudden anger and settled, deliberate resentmenl, so that we can better
undentand our judgments of propiety towards botl, kinds as ihey naturally
occur in everyday life. Part It, on the other hand, focuses on the salient kind,
namely s€ttled, delibemte res€ntment, because it is a discussion of moral
judgments of demerit and these judgments are concemed with fte proper
objccls of deliberate resentmenlr injuslice and wrongful injury.
This Butlerian account is a t€mpting interpretation ofsmith, but in the end
it is not convincing; moreovet adopting il does not do Smith's moral psy-
chology any favours. There are both textual and philosophical reasons to
resist a reading that sharyly sepamtes tlrc 'resentments' discussed iD Parts I
and II. First of all, Burler simply asserts what Smith attempts to dcmonstrate:
that we can lrace a path from lesentm€nt as we ordinarily experience it to our
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cognitively sophisticated judgments ofgood and evil, merit and demorit. Butler
starts out by announcing, 'resenlment is of two kinds' (Butler 1949: 123).
In doing so, he has both ditrerenliated and connect€d sudden and deliberate
angcr. His claim is that among our natural experiences of angry feelings,
there is a particular kind that always already contains claims of moral wrong.
ln helping himself to an already momlized attitudg Butler makes the con,
nection between natural r9s€n(mcnt and a sens€ ofjustice far easier to provq
but pcrhaps less interesting to contemporary audiences unconvinced that the
moral and the natual arc so easily reconciled, as a result. lf the goal is to
demonstrate our essentially morai nature by demonstrating how moral claims
are grounded in our Datural emotional reactions to the world, then surely ihe
interesting question is whethcr we can pick out a 'natural' (in the sense of
non-moral) sub-class of angry feelings that are also easily distinguished by an
overdy moral claim. Picking out just those reactions that can be developed
into moral judgmentr for no other rcason that lhese are the reactions lhat
can be d€veloped into moral judgments, app€ars 
- 
at least to the observer not
alr€ady convinced of the thesis 
- 
to be worryingly clrcular.
Furthermore, it seems fairly obvious that we experience more kinds of
ang€r/resentment than instinctivq irrational episodes of lashilg out and
oveftly moralized resentmen! we rcsent individual acts of molal injury yes,
but we may also resent other threats to and burdens on our wellbeilg, at least
ac{ording to everyday understandings of lhe word. We caD r€sent the demands
of a difrcult and unrewarding job or a demanding. draining relationship; we
can resent f€elings of disappointmcnt or \rulnembiliry. We may r€s€nt others
for failing to live up to our expcctations, or for their €xpectations of us
criswold gives the example of a painful, persistcnt dis€asq ovcl time my
reaction to it might at least leel likd resentment (2007: 22). Margaret Walker
notes that wc resent disruptions to a wide variety of social and political norms
as well as the overdy moral, and our resentment is sometimes inflected with
fear, snvy and a variety of anxiety (2006).10 IfButler mcant his distinction to
be exhaustivq his taxonomy is startlingly incompletq and his psychology less
comp€lling as a result. lf hc is singling out only those instances th&t are
independently, recognizably moral and those tha! are most obviously no,
moral (an instinctive reaction to harm), then his use of resentment as a pas-
sion that comes in moral and non-moral form. as €videncc of our moral
naturq is susp€ct.
Finally, Buller leav€s us with little sense of bow our mlional 'deliberate'
reseniment is relaied to inslinctive arger. He certainly do€sn't provide a
gen€tic or developm€ntal account of how the moralized passion €fierges from
the non-moral; rathet it is divinely 'implanted' in us. ln conhast, one of the
gr€at strengths ofTMS is how carefully the moral distinctions and categories
of its subsequent parts a.e built using only thc materials of Part I: our lr6tura]
impuls€s and emotions, social and unsocial, and the capacity for imaginative
sympathy that links us to one another lt is unchamcteristic for Smith to
develop the conditions of propri€ty for one psychological state in Part I, then
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switch terms lo an entirely difrcrent state 
- 
and indeed, a normatively laden
one in Pan II, without explaining how these stat€s ar€ related, or how the
emotion in Part lI camc to bc so r€adily laden with apFropriate normative
claims,
Thus, a Butl€rian account ol resentment is a pifall that Smith would do
well to avoid 
- 
and indeed, one that he does avoid. Thc discussion of resenr-
ment in Part Il is not jus! a story of how to derive moral judgmcnts of
dem€rit from a moralized version of natural resentment; it is a story of
how resenunent l€nds itself to mo8lization. ln Part ll, Section III, when
Smith discusses the 'irregularity' of our r€sentments and our gratitude, he
simultaneously takes us through the stages of resentrnent's shift frcm initial,
instinctive emotional retaliatjon to cognitively sharpen€d demands for
accountability. This is no! onlv a story of propriety; it reveals how the raw
emotion of rcsentment develops, apart from and prior to any intervenlions of
sympathy,
First, Smith notes that all animals resent any cause of pain, whelher
the cause is animate or inanimate: 'we are angry for a momcnt, cven at fie
stone that hurts us A child beats it, a dog barks at ir, a cholcric man is apt to
cuse it' GMS U.iii.l.l). For lational creatures, a little reflection corrccts this
general response, at l€ast in most cases. We realize, Smith notes, tha! 'before
anything can be th€ proper object of gratitude or resentment, it must not only
be the cause of pl€asure or pain, it must likewis€ be capabte of feeling them';
and his use of'before' rather than 'in order' is absolurely crucial, here. This is
not a statement about attitudinal propri€ty ground€d in sympathy, but rather
a'prccondition' of sorts. The proper objects ofresentment must be capable of
feeling pain, so that ow resenhe t can be fu f satisfed, not so others can
sympathize with it. The latter is a separate, later question. And so Smith
continues. 
- Animals are bettcr, but not perfect or 'complete' objects of
res€ntnent, as there is something missing or wanting 
- 
in our resentment of
animals: we camot demand recogition from them; we cannot brinS lheir
attitudes to the original harm in line with ou! own. ln otler words, we can't
get satisfaction. To be a truly satisfactory objcct of resentment! our antagonist
must have caused our pain, be capable of feeling pain heffell and have caused
ov pain ftom desigu that is, from the kinds of mental faculties rcquired for
trs to charye her mind about her actions (Il.iii.l.4). Only then will we attain
what is" Smift argues, the real aim of our resentmenl to have the object of
our res€ntment, the offender, experienc€ the sam€ painful attitude towards the
injuiy that we cun€ntly feel 
- 
and, in so feelinS, acknowledge its status as
a wrcngful injury The vengeful aspect of res€ntrnent desir€s a panicular
klrd of misery for ils objecl 'rcsentmcn( cannot be fully gratified, unless
the offender is not only made to grieve in his tum, but to grieve for that
particular wrong which we have suffercd from him' (I1.i.1.7).rr Smith is able
to claim, in Part II, that resentment contains a demand for acknowledgement
because that acknowledgement emerges as part of the retributivc dcsire,
sk€tched in Part L
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What st kes mc in thh developmental story is that Smith is conc€med to
identify the shift, not simply from instincrive to p/op€l resentment, but also
from instinctir,€ to rc/rf,tir8 resentment. He is idenrifying rhe .complere, or
'perfecf objects of onr resentmenr 
- complete from the- standpain; oJ that
rcsentmeht its intemal logic, as it vrere. In doing so, he painti a picture of
how resenlmen( moraliz€s itself on its own terms what ciswold calls ils
propensity to tell a jusrifying story abour itself (200?: 30). rath€r rhan m€rely
introducing a moralized version of a naturally amoral sentiment. This devei-
opmental story makes Smitht account psychologically morc insighttut rhan
Butler\, and ultimately allows him to ground genuinciy moral claims of merit
and d€merit into what fiIst seemed to be a decidediy non_moral asp€ct of our
Psychologies.
Conclusiom
At first glanc€, Smitht account of resenrment in The Theorv of Moml
.Sprrmearr seems to suffer from an unlo(unate inconsisrency. pertap, evcn
an ambjguity, in the rcfer€nt of lhe central term. He app€a$ to conffatssevcral
emotions under a single heading, lailing ro approp alely disringuish them, as
done in an earlier trcatment of resentnent by Joseph Butl€r. In fact, this
apparent inconsistency is evidenc€ of a much richer and more nuanced moral
psychology of retributive atritudes, which pays significant and much_needed
attenlion to the ph€nomenology and satisfaction of our resentments. borh
instinctive and'moraliz€d'. It is because. and not in spile of, the variation in
Smith\ description of resenlment, that he is able to employ it as the gmunding
for judgrnents of demerit and injustice.
I havc focused on a key differ€nce in ihe accounts of resentment Drovided
by Adam Smirh and Joseph Burier. While rt is temprrng ro read boLh phito-
sophers as using a single term 'resentmenr' to describe two distinct, ifrelared,
emotional states, this temptation would be an unfortunat€ misrepresentation
of Smith on resentment. It may app€ar that Smith presents two entircly
diff€rent versions of rcsentnent in Pa(s I and Il of the TMSj in fact, the
narrower! more overtly normative artirude described in part II develops
naturally out the natural reactive instinct presented in part l, acconling io
what I have callcd res€ntmentt 'intemal logic'.
There is a grcat dcal more to be said about the alinitics betwcen Smith and
Butler on r€sentment than is covcrcd in this essay. Certainly, in praising
Smith\ developmental story of rescntment at Butler\ expense, I havc nor
done justice to some of thc remarkable srrengths of Butler\ account. These
slrcngths include Butler's cmphasis on the sociability of r€sentment. that is.
our abil y ro cxperience vicarious resenrmcnt {rndignatton) on behalf of
othe$ and tlle moral expectations we place on off€nders in resenting them.
Butler also illustrates how we exercise our capacity for sympath€tic, imagi"
native engagemen( with the emotional lives ofothers in navigating our own; we
Ieam to curb our resentment to appropriate lcvcls (and indeed, even to forgive)
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by training ouGelves to 'be affecred towards the injurious person in the same
way any good men, rminlerested in the case, would be'(Butler 1949: I43).
lmpartial third parties play a key role in assessing .proper, resentment in Butler\
sermonq as they do in Smith the wide moral community is rhus invoked, even
in intcrpersonal instances of wrongdoing. In fact, Butlei anticipatcs Smith by
drawing L-ey connections among resentment. on the one hand- and mont
iudgmcnr. rerributi!ejusricc and lhe delence ofmoral norms. on the olhcr. And
Butlcr\ analysis of rcsentment extends bcyond Smith's in his elaborate dis-
cussion of forgiveness alongside resentment. In this manner. Butler indicates
how rcsentrnent plays a rclc. nol onl) rn rc(nbution, but also rn rccolcrlialror
Furtbermorq it might appear that in focusing on the 'raw matcrial, of
res€ntmentj I have missed the import of Smitht account. For Smith. the true
'moralization' of any emotion, social or unsocial, takes place tbrough the
complex psychological mechanism of sympathy. tl is in symparhizing ;r fail_
ing to sympathize with the motives and reactions of others that wc Jevelop a
sense of tieir propriety or impropriety. Ultimatelt any exp€rience of resent_
ment, whether instinctive or cognitiv€ly laden. is judged appropriatc or in_
appropriate accordiq to whether or not an imparrial ana wil-lnlormea
spectator would symparhize with it.
Yct Smith is not interested in r€sentment for matte$ of emotional propriety
alone. In Pan lI, proF\er resentment is the narural, afiective ground for our
moral judgmcnts of demerit. Resentment is one of .the great safe-guards of
the association of mankind, to protect the w€ak, to curb the violent and to
chastisc th€ guilry' GMS Il.ii.3.4). h also repres€nts our .narural s€nse of ih€
propricry and fitness of punishment' GLii.3.?). Smith is relucranr ro granr rharjustice is a matter of mere utility; rathcr, our sens€ of justice is harrla1,
grounded in that natural sentim€nt which animates us to abhor .fraud, perfidy,
and injustice, and to delight to see rhem punished' (ll.ii_3.9). lr therefo;e
matters significantly to Smith's proj€ct that the normatively laden reacrive
attitude capablc of grcunding our retributive judSments and molivations
ir Pan lI can be found among the natural passions and emotions describcd in
Part ll. The texl of TMS revcals a consist€nt, sophisticated account of the
passion of resentinent.
Moreover, Smith's analysis is significant for contemporary discussions of
resentment. ln contemporary philosophical lit€ralure on retriburion and
reconciliation, resentnent has come to stand as the retributive reactive altitude
par excellence.t2 As a result, the story philosophers tell about resentment iis
distinctive features, aimq rationality and gratification 
- 
will aff€ct the con-
clusions we draw about which actual angry experiences to take seriously as
rcsenhents. Contemporary philosophers have typjcally argucd for a naffow,
technical account of rescntrnent, in order that this moral attitude can be dis_
tinguished from the wide range of angry feelings we may experience in
everyday life, few of which can be articulaled as anything close io a moral
demand. Resentment, rhcy arguq is moralized anger; orjust that anger which
onebl, at least prima facie, ro bc lak€n seriously.
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Yet it is quite possible that limiting thc scope of morally significant ang€rs
does a further injusticc to those with the most reason (o feel r;ge As fem;isr
scholars like Alison Jaggar have noted, under hierarchical conalitions of social
in€quality in which dominanr values will lend to service rhe interest of
dominant groups, those mos! burdened by th€ status quo may final themselves
experiencing 'outlaw emotions': emotional reactions that ire dismissed by
others precisely because tiey calnot be r€construded as r€cognizable mor;l
claims, at ldast according to the framework operating in a p;tjcular moral
conmunity (2008i 3l). The exampte Jaggar offers of an outlaw emorion is
resentmenl (in this case, resentment ar,kindnesses, which are actuallv subtlc
expressions of oppre\,ive power-rclalion,hips). In di<rrnguishrng sharply
b€tween 'moralized' and non-moralized angcrs, philosophers 
-"y t 
"-p".themselves from focusing on morally significant angers 
- 
in this case. re;is_
tance to oppression 
- 
that cannot cu.rrently be adculated as moral claims.
Smith, on the other hand, is prepared not only to connect our moraljudgments of injustice and wrongdoing to our natural emotioDal reactions of
fts€ntment, but also, to allow for the possibility that the moral atlirudes
grounding these judgments are not so different from many other kinals of
anger we typically cxpe.ience. Acco.ding to the Smithian .story, ofresentrnent,
our natural passions are subject to thc influence of fortune (both individual
and socialr and are \uln€rable to lhe symprrhy or lack ofslmpathy. we
rc.eive from others amund us These contingent features ofour social iontext
may well influencc how even our best reflection is able to corrcct and curb our
immediate and instinctive angry rcacrions to the world. Smith gives us more
room, and more rcason, to take seriously angers that contempomry philoso-
phical accounts cannot. ID refusing to distinguish absoLrtely between narroq
'mora'ized' resentment and a'wider knge of our insrinctivE angry reactions _
indeed, by illustrating how beauiifully thc former aises our oathe distincrive
aims and features of tlrc later 
- 
Adam Smith may well be an important auy
for critical scholars wishing ro broaden the range ofsocial angen we ought to
takc s€riously.
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Notes
I I borcw the term tosnirively sharpened'f.om D,Arm$ and Jacobson (t993).
2 The idea thar jdgnenrs ot demcrir (or blane) ae Lrounded in our narurat ani,
rudes of r$cnimcnr ha( been rakcn up b) d nrmbcr o'conremDor.rv Dhitosooh.rs
mosr nor.bly in Percr Srra{:on! .Freedom and rcsenhent (2001r.'
1Increrydaylife,\c$nrmmt may dsib€ many d'frernr k inds of anger or !a, and
may be used inrerchangeabty with indignatron. irrirarion. fru.rration.-begrudgemenr.
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accents, urban development and 
- 
in an amusing rcf€rence borrowed trom Alan
Gibbard 
- 
p@uliar haircuts
I I Th€re is a rinsins familia.ity to any student of philosophy in this des.npdon of
resentnmt, of course Il k rcminisceDr of Nietehc\ famous tre3rment of er(istential
rcs€ntment, or /e$entimsr, ir Se'rion I oI The Genealogr oI Moruk (1967J.
12 Sce, lor exanple, Murphy and Hampton (1988). D'Arms and Jeobson (1993),
walker (2006), Grhwold (2007). Brudholm (2008).
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